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Abstract
In this paper, we study information cascades on graphs. In this setting, each node in the graph
represents a person. One after another, each person has to take a decision based on a private signal
as well as the decisions made by earlier neighboring nodes. Such information cascades commonly
occur in practice and have been studied in complete graphs where everyone can overhear the
decisions of every other player. It is known that information cascades can be fragile and based
on very little information, and that they have a high likelihood of being wrong.
Generalizing the problem to arbitrary graphs reveals interesting insights. In particular, we
show that in a random graph G(n, q), for the right value of q, the number of nodes making
a wrong decision is logarithmic in n. That is, in the limit for large n, the fraction of players
that make a wrong decision tends to zero. This is intriguing because it contrasts to the two
natural corner cases: empty graph (everyone decides independently based on his private signal)
and complete graph (all decisions are heard by all nodes). In both of these cases a constant
fraction of nodes make a wrong decision in expectation. Thus, our result shows that while both
too little and too much information sharing causes nodes to take wrong decisions, for exactly the
right amount of information sharing, asymptotically everyone can be right. We further show that
this result in random graphs is asymptotically optimal for any topology, even if nodes follow a
globally optimal algorithmic strategy. Based on the analysis of random graphs, we explore how
topology impacts global performance and construct an optimal deterministic topology among
layer graphs.
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1 Introduction
An Information Cascade occurs when a person observes the actions of others and then – in
spite of possible contradictions to his/her own private information – follows these same actions.
A cascade develops when people “abandon their own information in favor of inferences based
on earlier people’s actions”[12]. Information Cascades frequently occur in everyday life.
Commonly cited examples include the choice of restaurants when being in an unknown place
people choose the restaurant that already has many guests over a comparatively empty
restaurant, or hiring interview loops where interviewers follow earlier interviewer’s decisions
if they are not sure about the candidate. Notice that information cascades are not irrational
behavior; on the contrary, they occur precisely because people rationally decide based on
inferences derived from earlier people’s actions.
The simple herding experiment by Anderson and Holt illustrates Information Cascades
[3, 4](see also Chapter 16 in [12]). In this experiment, an urn contains three marbles, either
two red and one blue (majority red), or one red and two blue (majority blue). The players do
not know whether the urn is majority red or blue. One by one, the players privately pick one
marble from the urn, check its color, return it to the urn, and then publicly announce their
guess as to whether the urn is majority red or majority blue. The first and second player
will naturally base their guesses on the colors of the marble they picked, thus their guesses
reveals their private signals. For any subsequent player however, her rational guess may not
reflect her own signal. For example, suppose the first two players both guess red. In this
case, it is rational for the third player to also guess majority-red regardless of the color of the
marble she picked. Indeed, the third player makes her decision on a rational inference based
on the first two guesses. Since her guess does therefore not reveal any further information
about the urn to any subsequent player, every subsequent player will guess the urn to be
majority-red. The example shows that information cascades can be based on very little actual
information and thus fragile; and they can be wrong. Indeed, in the above example with
urns, it can be shown that with probability 1/5, a “wrong cascade” occurs, i.e., all players
(except from possibly a few at the beginning) will guess wrongly.
The standard model for information cascades studies the process in which players make
decisions sequentially based on their own private signals as well as the set of decisions made by
earlier players [6, 7, 23]. In this paper, we interpret and generalize the traditional information
cascade setting as a game in a graph. Each player is a node, and an edge between two
nodes v and w means that w can hear about v’s guess (assuming w is after v in the order of
decision-making). Thus the traditional information cascade model corresponds to a complete
graph (all players hear the decisions of all other players). At the other end of the spectrum,
the empty graph means that every player decides independently of all other players, purely
based on their own private signal. Casting the information cascade problem in this graph
setting allows us to study the range in between the two extreme points of complete and
empty graphs.
Studying this range in between reveals fascinating insights. Figure 1 shows the expected
number of wrong guesses in the above 3-marble-urn experiment in a random graph G(n, q)
topology, for different values of n and q. In the empty graph (q = 0), if all nodes take their
decisions independently, 1/3 of the players are wrong. In the complete graph (q = 1), 1/5 of
the players are wrong on average as discussed above. However, the interesting thing is that
for some values in between these two extremes, the number of wrong decisions is significantly
less. Indeed, it seems that for the right value of q and n→∞, the number of wrong decisions
tends to 0.
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and strategies.
These observations are intriguing: It looks like that if people share too much information,
a constant fraction of the population is wrong because of bad information cascades occurring.
If people share too little information, a larger constant fraction of the population is wrong
because the players take their decisions too independently, relying too much on their private
signal which has a constant probability of being wrong. But, if exactly the right amount of
information is shared, then it seems that in the limit, all players (at least asymptotically)
take the correct decision.
In this paper, we study this phenomenon. We prove that, indeed, in a random graph
the number of wrong nodes is at most O(logn) for the optimal value of q (Section 3). We
then study arbitrary graph topologies and show that O(logn) wrong nodes is optimal in a
strong sense (Section 4). Specifically, even in the best possible topology, there are at least
Ω(logn) wrong nodes. This result holds even if a global oracle tells each node whether it
should (a) base its decision solely on its private signal (thus revealing this signal as additional
information to all its neighbors) or (b) base its decision on the majority of private signal
and neighboring decisions as in the cascade model above. In other words, even if nodes can
“sacrifice” themselves to reveal additional information to their neighbors and even in the
best possible topology Ω(logn) wrong nodes is a lower bound. Finally, we derive an optimal
deterministic topology from among a family of layer graphs (Section 5). Detailed proofs and
analysis can be found in [22].
2 Related Work
Sequential decision-making has been studied in various areas including politics, economics
and computer science[21, 6, 7, 14, 12]. The primary concern on the Bayesian learning
model[7, 19, 6, 23, 20, 5, 1] is under what conditions asymptotically correct information
cascades occur. For specific graph topologies such as complete graphs and line graphs,
conditions on the private signals were addressed to guarantee the correctness of cascades[19, 9].
For arbitrary graph topologies, the approach of Acemoglu et al. [1] is intuitively quite
consistent to our k-layer topology(see Section 6) and can be used to explain why our
random network and selfishless decision-making algorithm achieve global optimality. While
their approach focuses on the asymptotic probability of correct cascades, our result can
quantitatively bound the expectation number of incorrect nodes.
There has been research on different sequential decision making models in graphs. For
example, Chierichetti et al. [10] study different algorithms for finding appropriate orderings
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to maximize the fraction making correct decisions and Hajiaghayi et al. [16] and Hajiaghayi
et al. [15] generalizes the model and improve related bounds. However, notice that the
threshold decision-making processes studied in these works fundamentally differ from the
information cascade setting we consider in this work. Indeed, the effect of too little/too much
information sharing being bad as shown in Figure 1 is not observed in such threshold models.
There also exists an impressive body of work on sequential and non-sequential decision
on arbitrary graphs that however do not capture information cascades as exemplified in
Anderson and Holt’s herding experiment. Typically, each node updates its opinion through
repeated averaging with neighbors. General conditions for convergence to consensus have
been developed[2, 11, 13]. Intrigued by the observation that consensus is usually not reached
in real world[18], Bindal et al. [8] use a game theoretic approach to study the equilibrium of
the dynamical process and measure the cost of disagreement via the Price of Anarchy[17].
3 Preliminaries
We introduce the formal definitions of our model. There are n nodes (numbered 1, 2, · · ·n)
whose neighboring relationship is depicted by a graph G = ([n], E). All nodes make decisions
sequentially according to their numbers in order to guess a global ground truth value b ∈ {0, 1}.
When making its decision, each node can only obtain a random partial information on b.
That is, when node i observes b, it can only get a private signal si which equals b with
probability p > 0.5 or equals 1− b with probability 1− p. The decision-making of a node not
only depends on its private signal observed from b, but also on the decisions made by its
previous neighbors. Note that the neighboring decisions may or may not be based on those
nodes’ private signals. More formally, let ci be the output decision or guess of node i and ci
be the decision vector (c1, c2, · · · , ci), if Li : {0, 1}i−1×{0, 1} → {0, 1} is the decision-making
algorithm for node i, we have in general ci = Li(ci−1, si).
Given the graph G and decision-making algorithms L1, L2, · · · , Ln, we use EG(L1, · · · , Ln)
to denote the expected number of nodes that output the wrong value 1− b. When it is clear
from the context, we may abbreviate this notation to EG, E(L1, · · · , Ln), or simply E . The
global objective of this sequentially decision-making process is to minimize EG(L1, · · · , Ln),
which is equivalent to maximizing the expected number of nodes who guess the ground truth
value correctly. We will show that such an optimization task can be achieved by adjusting
the graph topology or the decision-making algorithms.
Let Ei be the failure probability that node i outputs 1 − b. As a node often makes
inferences based on others’ decisions without knowing their private signals, it is intuitively
understandable that a node’s probability of correct decision-making can be quantified by the
number of private signals it can infer.
In reality, the Majority Algorithm is one of the most popular and practical algorithms for
decision-makings. This kind of “following the herd” algorithm can often achieve a locally
optimal effect. In this paper, we use Majk to denote the Majority Algorithm taking input
bits of length k. We just use Maj if k is clear from the context. In Chapter 16 of [12], Easley
and Kleinberg shows that the Majority Algorithm is optimal when a node observes multiple
independent signals.
I Claim 1. For any node i seeking to maximize Ei, when it observes multiple signals(including
its own private signal), its optimal algorithm is to output the majority of these observed
signals.
However, Anderson and Holt’s experiment shows that if all nodes apply the Majority
Algorithm, it is possible that essentially all of the nodes guess incorrectly, leading to an
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information cascade on the wrong side. In this paper, we address this problem and analyze
the impact of topology and algorithms on information cascades.
4 Random Graphs
In this section, we analyze the performance of the Majority Algorithm on random graphs.
Conventionally, G(n, q) denotes the random graph model that generates a random graph
with n nodes and each pair of nodes are connected by an edge with probability q. Different
connection probabilities induces completely different topologies, and thus dramatic changes
in EG(n,q). As introduced in Section 1, when q equals 0 or 1 corresponding to the empty or
complete topology, the expected number of wrong output decisions are both Θ(n).
In this section, we show that there exists a q such that the Majority Algorithm can
achieve only Θ(logn) expected wrong output decisions:
I Theorem 2. There exists a connection probability q = Θ(1/ logn) such that in G(n, q),
when all nodes apply the Majority Algorithm, we have EG(n,q) = Θ(logn).
We can also demonstrate the optimality of this connection probability by showing a lower
bound for the expected number of wrong decisions:
I Theorem 3. For any connection probability q, when all nodes apply the Majority Algorithm,
the expected number of wrong outputs in G(n, q) is lower bounded by Θ(logn), i.e. EG(n,q) =
Ω(logn).
A key ingredient to our proof is to bound the failure probability Ei for each node. Applying
the Chernoff Bound and the Union Bound, we can further bound the overall EG(n,q). The
following are two technical lemmas for bounding the failure probabilities:
I Lemma 4. If a constant fraction f > 0.5 of the first i nodes are correct (resp. wrong),
node i+ 1’s failure (resp. correct) probability Ei+1 is upper bounded by e−Θ(iq).
I Lemma 5. If a constant fraction f > 0.5 of the first i nodes are correct, s.t. f1−f ≥
√
q
1−q ,
then node i+ 1’s failure probability is upper bounded by p.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
In this subsection, we provide a detailed proof of Theorem 2.
The reason why random graphs behave well for the right value of q is that randomness
defers the process of information cascades. The fewer neighbors, the more likely a not will
output its private signal, thereby 1) having a high probability of being wrong, but 2) revealing
important information to its neighbors. When q = Θ(1/ logn), with high probability each of
the first Θ(logn) nodes have at most one neighbor. By definition of Majority Algorithm, any
node with only one neighbor will be forced to output its own private signal.
Using Lemma 4, we can prove that an established cascade among the first logn/q nodes
decides the outputs of all later nodes with high probability:
I Lemma 6. If among the first logn/q nodes, only a small constant fraction f < 0.5 output
wrongly, then for the later n− (logn/q) nodes, the expected number of wrong outputs is at
most O(1).
Lemma 6 is insufficient to bound the Θ(logn) expected failure nodes as required by
Theorem 2, in that it only bounds the loss of later nodes in the sequence. It could be the
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case that the first logn/q = Θ(log2 n)) nodes all fail. To bound the overall E , it is essential
to analyze the performance of the first logn/q nodes. We can use an induction argument to
show that for the optimal q, the first logn/q nodes are majority-correct with high probability:
I Lemma 7. Let δ = 12 (p+
√
p√
p+
√
1−p ). There exists connection probability qopt = Θ(1/ logn)
such that the first Θ(logn/q) nodes contains at least δ portion of correct outputs with
probability 1−O(n−1 logn).
Proof. We can prove Lemma 7 by induction. Consider dividing the first Θ(logn/q) nodes
into Θ(logn) segments, where each segment contains Θ(1/q) = Θ(logn) many nodes. We
analyze each segment independently and show that
There exists q1 = Θ(1/ logn), such that the first segment contains δ portion of correct
outputs with probability at least 1−O(n−1).
If the first i segments contain δ portion of correct outputs, then the (i+ 1)th segment
will also contain δ portion of correct outputs with probability 1−O(n−1).
By a single Union Bound, we can combine these two results and show that the first Θ(logn/q)
nodes contain δ portion of correct outputs with probability 1− logn ·O(n−1). J
Lemma 7 and 4 together imply a Θ(logn) upper bound for the expected number of wrong
outputs among the first Θ(logn/q) nodes:
I Lemma 8. If q = qopt, the first Θ(logn/q) nodes’ expect to have at most Θ(logn) many
wrong outputs.
Proof of Theorem 2. With Lemma 6, 7 and 8 proved, the expected number of wrong output
decisions under connection probability qopt is bounded by
EG(n,q) =
n∑
i=1
Ei =
logn/q∑
i=1
Ei +
n∑
i=logn/q+1
Ei
≤ Θ(logn) + (1−O(n−1 logn)) ·O(1) +O(n−1 logn) · n = Θ(logn).
(1)
which completes the proof. J
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3
In the previous section, we prove that for the optimal connection probability qopt = Θ(1/ logn),
the expected number of wrong outputs is reduced to Θ(logn). However, it remains a problem
whether we can move beyond Θ(logn). In this section, we prove Theorem 3 which states
that the bound in Theorem 2 is asymptotically optimal.
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove this theorem for two separate cases, namely when q =
O(1/ logn) and q = ω(1/ logn).
When q = O(1/ logn), the intuition is that we need at least Θ(1/q) nodes before
accumulating an actual influential cascade. For the ith nodes where i ≤ 1/q, its chance of
being isolated is (1 − q)i + iq(1 − q)i−1 ≥ (1 − q)1/q ∼ 1/e. Therefore the node’s failure
probability is at least Ei = (1− p) · Pr[isolated] = (1− p)/e. This lower bounds the expected
number of failure nodes by (1− p)/(eq) = Θ(1/q).
When q = ω(1/ logn), a wrong cascade occurs with high probability, thus resulting in a
significant number of failure nodes. With probability (1 − p)Θ(1/q), all of the first Θ(1/q)
nodes observe a wrong signal and output the wrong guesses. Using Lemma 4, we can show
that with high probability, the majority of later nodes follow this wrong cascade. Therefore,
the total number of failure nodes is at least (1− p)Θ(1/q) ·Θ(n) = n1−o(1) = Ω(logn). J
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5 General Lower Bound
In this section, we design a non-constructive scheme that finds the optimal decision-making
algorithms for general graphs. Given the graph G = ([n], E), our goal is to find the set of
algorithms {Li}ni=1 such that (L1, · · · , Ln) = arg minL′1,··· ,L′n EG(L′1, · · · , L′n).
An important use of the non-constructive scheme is to provide a general lower bound
for arbitrary topology. For any set of decision-making algorithms in a topology G, we can
simulate it on a complete graph by considering only edges in G. Thus the minimal E for
complete graphs is a general lower bound for arbitrary topology:
I Theorem 9. The expected number of wrong nodes E under the optimal decision-making
algorithms of complete graphs lower bounds the E of any algorithms in any topology.
From our previous discussion on random graphs, we know that the expected number of
wrong guesses E highly depends on the number of nodes revealing their private signals. This
inspires us to make the following definitions:
I Definition 10. Node i reveals valid information under ci−1 if and only if node i outputs
its private signal under ci−1, i.e. ci = Li(ci−1, si) = si. Furthermore, we denote Valid(·) as a
function that extracts a vector of valid information out of a decision vector, i.e. cj is in the
vector Valid(ci) if and only if cj is valid.
I Definition 11. A node i’s reveal set RSi is the set of ci−1 which causes node i to reveal
valid information.
Note that any valid information is correct with probability p and is independent of other
nodes. Using the same Bayesian argument[12], we can prove a similar lemma as Claim 1 in
Section 3, which states that a node’s guess is beneficial for later nodes if and only if the
guess is valid:
I Lemma 12. For a node i seeking to minimize its failure probability Ei, the optimal
decision-making algorithm is to perform the Majority Algorithm on Valid(ci−1)
⋃{si}, i.e.
ci = Maj(Valid(ci−1), si).
5.1 A non-constructive optimal algorithm scheme for general graphs
In this section, we provide a general scheme for finding the optimal decision-making algorithms
of all nodes in arbitrary topologies. Our scheme is non-constructive in that it neither explicitly
specifies what the optimal algorithms are, nor shows how to find them efficiently.
Given the underlying topology, all the nodes decide their algorithms sequentially in a
greedy way as follows. Node 1 publicly announces L1, based on its own rationality, then node
2 announces L2 with the knowledge of L1, etc(see Algorithm 1). Any node i will base its
knowledge on L1, · · · , Li−1 when deciding Li. Each node designs its own decision-making
algorithm in order to locally minimizes the failure probability. Denote this construction
scheme as GC(·), the abbreviation of “greedy construction”, then for node i, we have
Li = GC(L1, · · · , Li−1). We can prove by contradiction that such a locally optimal scheme
lead to an overall optimality:
I Theorem 13. L1, L2, . . . , Ln constructed as in Algorithm 1 minimizes the expected number
of wrong nodes, i.e. E(L1, L2, . . . , Ln).
ICALP 2016
64:8 Information Cascades on Arbitrary Topologies
Algorithm 1 A non-constructive optimal algorithm scheme for general graphs
1: Given L1, · · · , Ln−1, node n constructs Ln that aims at minimizing its own failure
probability En.
2: Given L1, · · · , Ln−2, and also the fact that node n is greedy, node n− 1 constructs Ln−1
such that the overall loss of him and node n is minimized.
3: This process continues. Each Li greedily minimizes the expected number of wrong nodes
after among {i, · · · , n} given L1, · · · , Li−1.
4: Node 1 knows that all later nodes are “greedy”. Their algorithms L2, · · · , Ln can all be
written as a function of L1. It then constructs L1 such that E is minimized.
5: Knowing what L1 is, we can backtrack L2, and recursively all the output algorithms Li.
5.2 Optimal algorithms for complete graphs
In this section, we specify the optimal decision-making algorithms for complete graphs
and thus provide a general lower bound for our model(by Theorem 17). Several intrinsic
properties regarding information cascades in complete graph will also be presented.
We start with a lemma showing that optimal algorithm will either reveal valid information
or perform Majority Algorithm on all previous guesses.
I Lemma 14. In the optimal algorithm, a node either reveals valid information or apply
Majority Algorithm on all previous outputs, i.e.
Li =
{
si c
i−1 ∈ RSi
Maj(ci−1) ci−1 6∈ RSi .
It is worth pointing out several non-trivial points of Lemma 14 : (a) the Majority Algorithm
is performed on previous guesses only and ignores its own private signal; (b) the Majority
Algorithm is performed on all previous guesses, not only on the valid guesses. An established
result in the proof of Lemma 14 is that the Majority Algorithm will cascade on complete
graphs, i.e. if a node performs Majority Algorithm, all later nodes will also perform Majority
Algorithm. This implies the existence of a switching point, where all nodes prior to this point
reveal their private signals, and all later nodes perform Majority Algorithm based on former
nodes’ signals. If we can estimate the position of this switching point, then an estimation of
E is achieved.
Lemma 14 specifies a node’s action outside the reveal set. However, to get an explicit
representation of Li, an understanding of the reveal set itself is required. We introduce the
following lemma that fills this gap.
Denote diff(ci−1) = (# 1 in Valid(ci−1))− (# 0 in Valid(ci−1)), which serves as a criteria
to measure the strength of valid information in previous decision vector ci−1 = (c1, · · · , ci−1).
I Lemma 15. The reveal set of a node i can be explicitly expressed with respect to some
parameters δn(·), where RSi = {ci−1 : |diff(ci−1)| ≥ δn(i)}.
Proof. This lemma follows from the fact that a node outputs based on the Bayesian prob-
ability for the ground truth bit b, which depends solely upon diff(ci−1). Given ci−1, the
Bayesian probability for b is Pr[b = 0|c
i−1] = 11+( p1−p )diff(ci−1)
Pr[b = 1|ci−1] = 11+( 1−pp )diff(ci−1)
. (2)
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Lemma 14 implies that for each node, (a) if the previous decision vector convinces it that b
equals Maj(ci−1) with high probability, it follows the majority of former output decisions; (b)
otherwise, it tries to provide more information by revealing its own private signal. As implied
by Equation (2), the larger |diff(ci−1)| is, the more likely b = Maj(Valid(ci−1)). This lead us
to conclude the existence of a threshold δn(i) such that Li applies Majority Algorithm if and
only if |diff(ci−1)| ≥ δn(i). J
Finally, given i and n as input, we show how to efficiently derive δn(i) in average O(logn)
time. Denote E(i, d) to be the expected number of wrong nodes given that |diff(ci−1)| = d.
The idea is to use recursion to derive E(i, d) for all i and d, in the process of which {δn(i)|i}
may be calculated. If a node k chooses to reveal its private signal, E(k, d) is updated as
E(k, d) = q1 · E(k + 1, d+ 1) + (1− q1) · E(k + 1, d− 1),
where q1 is the probability that node k’s private signal matches the majority of former guesses.
Similarly, if node k chooses to do Majority Algorithm, E(k, d) is updated as
E(k, d) = q2 ·
(
n− k + d2
)
+ (1− q2) · k + d2 ,
where q2 is the probability that the majority of former outputs is correct. Therefore, we can
calculate {E(i, d)} in time O(n2). A further improvement can be made by exploiting the
properties of δn(): δn(i+ 1)− 1 ≤ δn(i) ≤ δn(i+ 1) + 1, Thus to calculate {δn(i)}, it suffices
to calculate {E(i, d) | d < δn(i), i ≥ n}, which requires only n · maxi{δn(i)} = O(n logn)
time complexity.
I Lemma 16. Given n as input, we can calculate the set {δn(i)} in O(n logn) time.
5.3 General lower bound for our model
Finally we analyze the expected number of wrong nodes for the optimal algorithms in
complete graphs, and provide a general Θ(logn) lower bound for the model.
I Theorem 17. The expected number of wrong nodes E for any topology and any algorithm
is at least Θ(logn).
Proof. It suffices to prove that the E of the optimal algorithms in complete graph is bounded
by Θ(logn). In the proof of Lemma 14, we develop the concept of a “switching point”,
where all nodes prior to this point reveal valid information and all nodes afterwards perform
Majority Algorithm. Denote m as a random variable of the switching point’s position. We
prove that at least one of the following happens: (a) m ≥ (logp/(1−p) n)/2; or (b) E is greater
than
√
n/2.
If m < (logp/(1−p) n)/2, then from Equation (2), we know that the majority of revealed
signals are wrong with probability at least (1 + (p/(1− p))m)−1 > n−0.5/2. So the expected
number of wrong nodes is lower bounded by (n−m)/√n which is asymptotically greater
than
√
n/2. Therefore, for the optimal output algorithms in complete graph, E is at least
min
(
(1− p) logp/(1−p) n
/
2,
√
n
/
2
)
= Ω(logn). J
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Figure 3 A k-layer graph.
6 Optimal K-Layer Topology
In section 3, we show that the optimal E for random graphs is Θ(logn), which is asymptotically
the same as the general lower bound in Theorem 17. Yet the question remains what is the
actual optimal topology for the Majority Algorithm.
In this section, we propose a family of layer graphs and search for the optimal topology
among this family. We claim, without proof, that the optimal topology of layer graphs is
actually the optimal topology for Majority Algorithm.
To find the optimal topology, it helps to first understand the hidden insights behind small
overall E . In the optimal algorithms for complete graphs, nodes first judge the strength of
the current cascade, and then decide whether to follow the cascade or reveal their own signals
to strengthen the cascade. Such a think-before-acting way of decision-making guarantees
the correctness probability of any established cascade, and thus results in good overall
performance. We hope to know whether such think-before-acting could make it possible for
Majority Algorithm to achieve optimality simply by adjusting the topology. This inspires us
the following definition of layer graphs.
I Definition 18 (Definition of layer graphs). A graph is said to have k layers if it can be
separated into k disjoint groups, S1, · · · , Sk, where any node in group Si is connected to and
only to all nodes in Si−1. See Figure 3 for an example.
I Algorithm 19. Given a k-layer graph G, we consider how nodes perform in G. First of
all, similar to the optimal algorithms in complete graph, we have |S1| many nodes revealing
valid information at the very front. If there exists a cascade in S1 (the number of one choices
outmatches another by at least two), then all later nodes follow this cascade. Otherwise, nodes
in S2 reveal their private signals. This process continues until a cascade happens in some
layer. In this sense, layer graphs do contains the think-before-acting way of decision-making.
In the following sections, we find the optimal topology among layer graphs, and show
that the expected number of wrong nodes E for such optimal topology is also Θ(logn). This
optimal E will be compared to previous bound and results, from which we will be able to
glimpse the limit of Majority Algorithm. Throughout this section, if not otherwise mentioned,
we will assume that the output algorithm is Majority Algorithm. We denote the expected
number of wrong nodes on a k-layer topology (S1, · · · , Sn) as E(|S1|, · · · , |Sn|).
6.1 Optimal topology for layer graphs
Remark 19 provides an intuitive way to calculate the E of any layer graph. Given i independent
signals, we denote pw(i) as the probability that these signals generate a wrong cascade,
J. Wan, Y. Xia, L. Li, and T. Moscibroda 64:11
and pn(i) as the probability that these signals does not generate cascade in either side. A
recursion regarding E of any layer graph can be shown to be:
E(a1, · · · , ak) = (1− p) · a1 + pw(a1) · (n− a1) + pn(a1) · E(a2, · · · , ak), (3)
where (1− p)a1 is the expected number of wrong nodes among the first layer, n− a1 is the
expected number of wrong nodes among later layers under wrong cascade, and E(a2, · · · , ak)
is the expected number of wrong nodes of later layers under no cascade. By extending the
recursive term, we can simplify Equation (3) into
E(a1, · · · , ak) =
k∑
i=1
( i−1∏
j=1
pn(aj) ·
(
(1− p) · ai + pw(ai) · (n−
i−1∑
j=1
aj)
))
. (4)
I Algorithm 20. Our goal is to estimate E of the optimal layer graph to the Θ(logn) level.
Any approximation of E + o(logn) would be satisfying. This relaxation releases us from
getting an exact optimum and allows us to make proper adjustments that greatly reduce
the difficulty of the calculation. For example, in the derivation of Equation (3) and (4), we
assume without loss of generality that each layer has an even number of nodes. This will
result in O(1) changes in the optimal parameters, which is tolerable.
To find a set of parameters {k, a1, · · · , ak} such that E(a1, · · · , ak) is minimized, we need
the following basic steps:
We first show that in Equation (3), the contribution of pn(a1)E(a2, · · · , ak) is limited
and may be discarded without much change to the optimal parameters. Therefore, it
suffices to consider the optimization of a1 in the equation
arg min
a1
f(a1) = arg min
a1
(
(1− p) · a1 + pw(a1) · (n− a1)
)
. (5)
We then solve the equation f(x+ 1)− f(x) = 0, which has a unique solution. It can be
shown that f(a1) first decreases then increases with respect to a1. Thus the solution for
f(x+ 1)− f(x) = 0 offers an approximation to the optimal a1 with only O(1) error.
After solving the optimal size of the first layer, we can apply this method recursively to
calculate the optimal size of all layers.
The proof for the above three results are complex and brute-force. First, we present a
lemma that addresses result 2. It is worth pointing out that Equation 5 is the expected loss
when we have only two layers, with the first layer of size a1 and the second layer of size
n − a1. Therefore, result 2 is equivalent to finding an optimal topology among two layer
graphs. For convenience, we denote s = 1/(4p(1− p)).
I Lemma 21. For the optimal topology among two layer graphs, its first layer has size
logs n− logs(logs n)/2 +O(1).
I Theorem 22. The optimal layer topology has k = n/ logs n + o(n/ logs n) many layers.
The first layer has a1 = logs n many nodes. The size of layer i may be written as a recursion
of the size of layer i− 1,
ai ∼ logs(sai−1 − ai−1). (6)
In other words, the optimal topology satisfies the following structural properties:
The sizes of layers gradually decrease, and the number of layers with size logs n − i is
(s− 1)n/(si+1(logs n− i)).
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The first (s− 1)n/(s logs n) layers have size logs n.
The following (s− 1)n/(s2(logs n− 1)) layers have size logs n− 1, and so on.
We believe that the layer topology provided in Theorem 22 is actually the optimal
topology for Majority Algorithm. However, we have not yet come up with any rigorous proof
to verify our conjecture. We will leave this as an open problem for future work.
I Conjecture 23. The layer topology provided in Theorem 22 is the optimal topology for
Majority Algorithm.
6.2 Experiments on the optimal parameters
For layer graphs, Equation (6) can be used to calculate the optimal parameters with high
precision. Thus the results in Theorem 22 is a very tight approximation, which works
flawlessly if we only seek to analyze the complexity of E . However, in real life, users might
wish to achieve the exact optimal parameters. In this case, the constant error in our equations
can not be neglected. Here, we introduce an algorithm that searches for the exact optimal
topology in average O(1) run time.
Recall that layer graphs satisfy the following properties. For a k-layer structure (a1, · · · , ak),
if the first layer cascades, the rest of the nodes follow this cascaded result. Otherwise, the
rest of the nodes become equivalent to a (k − 1)-layer structure, with each layer’s size being
(a2, · · · , ak) (or (a2 + 1, · · · , ak) if a1 is odd). Therefore, for a fixed a1, the optimal k and
a2, · · · , ak should be chosen such that,
If a1 is even,
(k − 1, a2, · · · , ak) = arg max
k′,a′1,··· ,a′k
E
(
a′1, · · · , a′k
∣∣∣ k′∑
i=1
a′i = n− a1
)
. (7)
If a1 is odd,
(k − 1, a2 + 1, · · · , ak) = arg max
k′,a′1,··· ,a′k
E
(
a′1, · · · , a′k
∣∣∣ k′∑
i=1
a′i = n− a1 + 1
)
. (8)
This implies that given the optimal layer topologies for all n′ < n, calculating the optimal
layer topology for n should be easy. We can simplify the problem into an optimization over a1,
instead of the optimization over many parameters. A further analysis shows that the optimal
layer topology for n nodes and n + 1 nodes cannot differ by too much. More specifically,
denote the optimizing parameter for n nodes as (kn, an1 , · · · , ankn), then |an1 − an+11 | ≤ 1.
Using this, together with the recursive idea in Equation 7 and 8, we can design an algorithm
that runs in time O(n), and find the optimal layer topology for all n′ ≤ n. The amortized
running time of this algorithm is only O(1).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed information cascades on various network topologies. We provide a
non-constructive optimal algorithm scheme for general graphs, solve the scheme for complete
graph and achieve a general lower bound for our model. We also studied Majority Algorithm
in random graphs and layer graphs, the minimal E of which was shown to be asymptotically
the same with our general lower bound. From the experiment results, a gap between the
general lower bound and layer graphs can be observed. We believe this to be a result of
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the difference in the model setting, i.e. Majority Algorithm is weaker than optimal general
algorithms.
Future work in this area may include the study of the following scenarios.
The nodes’ order of decision-making is no longer fixed and given, but instead randomly
sampled from all permutations.
The topology is fixed and we are only able to add or remove a fixed portion of the edges.
The goal is to minimize E under this constraint.
Plant nodes in the network. These nodes could sacrifice themselves to reveal their true
private signal. How should a topology designer control and position these plant nodes in
the topology?
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